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I. INTRODUCTION
The entry of illegal aliens' into the United States is a significant
national problem. 2  Although overlooked for years, illegal immigra-
tion has now reached levels at which considerable public interest has
been evoked. Millions of illegal aliens work in the United States
and, while it can only be roughly estimated, their number appears to
be growing at-an alarming rate.3
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is the agency
in charge of enforcing federal regulation of aliens. Although INS is
empowered to inspect all persons entering the United States to deter-
mine their citizenship,4 it has not succeeded in eliminating the influx
of illegal aliens whose transit is motivated by the increasing lack of
economic opportunity at home.5 The INS has referred to the illegal
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1. The term "illegal alien" is used here to denote those foreign rationals who entered the
United States in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1932, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503
(1976). Any alien who enters the United States without examination or through misrepresenta-
tion or fraud violates 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1976). Sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act
will be referred to in this article under their Act designation rather than their United States Code
designation.
2. See V. BRIGGS, MEXICAN MIGRATION AND THE U.S. LABOit MARKr: A MOUNTINO
ISSUE FOR THE SEVENTIES (Austin Center for the Study of Human Rfscourses, Monograph No.
3, 1975); Catz, Regulating the Employment of Illegal Aliens: DeCanas and Section 2805, 17
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 751 (1977); Greene, Immigration Law and Rural Poverty--The Problems
of the Illegal Entrant, 1969 DUKE L.J. 475, 478-79; Salinas & Torres, The Undocumented Mexican
Alien: A Legal Social and Economic Analysis, 13 Hous. L. REv. 863, 81-84 (1976).
3. More than 500,000 illegal aliens were apprehended in 1972. 1972 INS ANN. Rt ,, 7. In
1973, the figure exceeded 650,000. 1973 INS ANN. REP. 8. In 1974-75, more than 750,000
were apprehended. 1974 INS ANN. REP. 9. Approximately 90% of those arrested during these
years were Mexican nationals. 1975 INS ANN. REP. 13. In 1975-76 the figure exceeded 780,000.
1976 INS ANN. REP, 14.
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1970).
5. For a discussion of the illegal alien problem, see United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S, 891,
900-14 (1975) (Appendix to opinion of Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment); United States
v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 402-03 (S.D. Cal. 1973). See also, Present Scope of the Illegal
Alien Problem, 54 CONG. DIG. 8 (1975). The most recent and comprehensive account of the
illegal alien problem is contained in the PRESIDENT'S INTR-Ac.ENcy TASK FORCE STUDY,
DOMESTIC COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON ILLEGAL ALIENS, PRELIMINARY Rr:,'oRT (1976).
Some have suggested that national policy sanctions illegal entry as a surrogate farm labor
program. E.g., J. SAMORo, Los MOJADOS: THE WErBACK STORY 57 (1971). See Greene, Public
Agency Distortion of Congressional Will: Federal Policy Towards Non-Resident Alien Labor, 40
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 440, 454 (1972), that suggests INS officials routinely ignore employers who
contract for and use illegal labor. Even when business sites are raided by INS officials, the cm-
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entries across the southern border as a "continuing surge" and admits
its inability to handle the situation effectively.6  The vast majority
of illegal aliens entering the United States escape detection at or near
the border and find refuge in both urban and agricultural centers
throughout the United States. In its frustration to control the mas-
sive influx of illegal aliens INS has resorted to enforcement techni-
ques that run afoul of the fourth amendment. These techniques, all
resorted to without warrant, include massive dragnet raids at factories
or farm labor camps as part of an area-wide control operation and
street encounters, in which individuals with latino characteristics are
stopped and interrogated.
Most INS abuse, a result of freewheeling efforts to enforce the
immigration laws against illegal aliens, is suffered by Mexican-
Americans. 7  For example, INS agents randomly interrogate individ-
uals on city streets and other public places about their citizenship.
They also invoke their authority to conduct mass raids on employment
centers. Such searches for illegal aliens are often directed against
people who are non-white and speak a language other than English.8
This results in police-state like confrontations between INS agents
and citizens, lawfully-present aliens, as well as illegal aliens.9 These
6. 1974 INS ANN. REP. iiL See also Hearings on Oversight of the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and Int'l Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 6-7 (1978) (Statement of Commissioner Leonard
F. Chapman, Jr., Immigration and Naturalization Service).
Service).
7. Berman, Harassing Aliens: Roundup in the Barrio, A.C.L.U. NEWSLETrER (1973)
(reporting the physical abuse and property damage suffered by legal and illegal aliens during INS
"dragnet" raids). See also Hearings on Bureau of Customs Border Inspection Procedures Before
the Sumcomm. and the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Approprtations of
the House Comm. on Appropriations for 1973, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5 (1972); Hearings on
Treasury Dep. Before the Subcomm. on the Treasury. Postal Service, and General Government
Appropriations of the House Comm. on Appropriations for 1973, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1972).
Sess., pt. 1 (1972).
8. Since immigration to the United States is increasingly motivated by adverse economic
and political conditions in the Third World, large numbers of illegal immigrants are non-uhite
and do not speak English. For a discussion of this phenomenon see A. FRAGOMEN, THE ILEGA.L
ALIEN: CRIMINAL OR ECONOMIC RE-UGEE (1973). INS estimates that there are approximately
12 million illegal immigrants in the United States, the majority of whom are Mexican. United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). Former INS Commissioner Chapman
articulates the restrictionist view on illegal immigration in Chapman, A Look at Illegal
Immigration: Causes and Impact on the United States, 13 SAN, DIEGO L. REv. 34 (1975).
9. The following statement describes INS enforcement activities in Los Angeles:
Search operations are being conducted, without reasonable or probable cause to believe
that individuals stopped and interrogated are in fact aliens, merely because such persons
appear to an individual officer to be "foreign looking."
Reports come in almost daily of immigration officers stopping and interrogating in-
dividuals at bus stops, on public streets, in private businesses, and of knocking on doors
at private residences and apartments and requiring individuals therein to produce proof
of lawful status in the United States.
119 CONG. REc. 31686 (1973) (remark of Sen. Tunney, quoting correspondence from the Los
Angelas Trial Lawyers' Association).
Since illegal presence in the United States is not a crime, an alien who is apprehended is
subject '-ly to deportation proceedings. It is questionable whether local law enforcement may
enforce federal immigration law when the offense involved is handled by the administrative pro-
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abuses continue because the Supreme Court has not directly addressed
the question whether INS agents may, without warrant or probable
cause, stop persons located beyond the border and believed to be aliens
when there is no reason to believe they are in the country illegally.' 0
This question was recently addressed in Illinois Migrant Council
v. Pilliod," a case which indicates that one court is ready to redefine
the limits of INS powers to stop and interrogate suspected illegal im-
migrants. In a decision that was affirmed and ultimately modified by
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that INS agents lack
authority to interrogate individuals unless they have reason to be-
lieve, based on specific- articulable facts, that the person questioned
is an alien unlawfully in the United States.'2  This article will analyze
the decisions of the 'district court and court of appeals in Illinois Mi-
grant Council. It will consider the United States Supreme Court pro-
nouncements on the subject of INS searches, and it will attempt to
clarify the level of suspicion required by the United States Constitu-
tion before an INS agent can stop a person on the street and inquire
about his or her citizenship.
II. REVIEW OF INS "AREA CONTROL" OPERATIONS IN THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
The plaintiffs'" in Illinois Migrant Council instituted a class action
on behalf of "all persons of Mexican descent and all Spanish surnamed
persons"' 4 legally within the State of Illinois. They sought declara-
tory and injunctive relief from INS street interrogrations and "area
control" operations.' 5  Plaintiffs alleged that INS officials in the Chi-
cess. In Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487 (1885), local law enforcement officials arrested a military
deserter. At that time desertion was not a federal crime. The Supreme Court held that local
officials could not arrest or detain a deserter because the offense wa; not triable and punishable
in the courts. This holding should apply to immigration law enforcement, prohibiting local of-
ficials from arresting or detaining an alien for illegal entry. See Comment, Illegal Aliens and
Enforcement: Present Practices and Proposed Legislation, 8 U.CAL.D. L. Rtv. 127 (1975).
10. This question was specifically reserved in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U,S.
873, 884 n.9 (1975), that held roving border patrol agents may not constitutionally stop an
automobile near the border to question its occupants when the only ground for suspicion is
that they appear to be of Mexican descent.
11. 398 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. I11. 1975), affd, 540 F.2d 1062 (7ti Cir. 1976), modilied upon
rehearing en bane, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977). INS did not seek review in the United States
Supreme Court.
12. Id. at 899.
13. The plaintiffs were a nonprofit corporation serving migrant agricultural workers.
predominately of Mexican descent, and six individuals who were either U.S. citizens or perma-
nent resident aliens. Id. at 885.
14. Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062, 1065 (7th Cir. 1976), modilied
upon rehearing en bane, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977).
15. The term "area control operations" refers to the INS practice of conducting mass raids
on a particular building, dwelling. or neighborhood because it is believed illegal immigrants
will be found. Invariably, citizens and lawful resident aliens are interrogated or detained in
(Vol. 39:66
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cago district office conducted and would continue to conduct a "pattern
and practice of harassment, including illegal searches and seizures,
arrests, interrogations, detentions, and mass raids against the individ-
ual plaintiffs and their class in violation of the First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments."' 6
Pursuant to the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction the
district court held an evidentiary hearing, after which the district court
made extensive findings of fact. The court divided the evidence into
four broad and sometimes overlapping categories: street encounters,
entries into dwellings, raids on employment centers, and documentary
evidence consisting of operations manuals for INS agents.' 7
Three street encounters took place-one in Chicago and two in
Rochelle, Illinois. The Chicago encounter occurred during the first
week of October, 1974. Two INS agents approached plaintiff Lopez
while he was walking to his office on Jackson Boulevard. They asked
Lopez if he lived in the area and he replied that he did not, but that he
worked around there. The agents then asked him where he was born.
When Lopez asked why he was being questioned the agent said he was
from INS and showed Lopez his identification. Lopez then told the
agent that he was born in New Mexico and was of Mexican descentf'
The agent left without further interrogation.
Two separate street encounters took place in Rochelle, Illinois. On
the morning of September 18, 1974, plaintiffs Sandoval and Montanez
drove to the office of the Illinois Migrant Council where they worked. As
they parked the car, an INS car pulled up next to them. The agents
asked Montanez where he was born and he replied, "Mexico." The
agents demanded that he show them some identification and threat-
ened to take him to jail in Chicago. Montanez produced a satisfactory
permanent resident alien card. The agents then asked Sandoval, an
American citizen of Mexican descent, to show them his identification.
He refused and the agents forced him into their car presumably to take
him to Chicago. He continued to refuse to show them any identification
but because in his protests he implied he was a United States citizen,
the agents let him goi 9 The other street encounter occurred when Jose
Ortiz, walking with a friend, was stopped by two INS agents. They
such operations. The Investigations Division of INS conducts area control operations, pri-
marily in major urban and suburban areas. The Investigations Division only has 1,139 agents
throughout the country responsible for conducting nonborder operations. Hearings on Over-
sight of the Immigration and Naturalization Service Before the Subcomm. on Immigration. Citi-
zenship, and Int'l Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciari'. 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 443 (1978).
See, Franco & Warren, The Illegal Alien Assault: The United States Retreats from the Border,
14 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 747, 762 (1977). See also 1976 INS ANN. REP. 15-16.
16. 540 F.2d at 1065.
17. 398 F. Supp. at 887-91.
1. Id. at 887-88.
19. Id. at 887.
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asked Ortiz for his papers. He was allowed to leave upon complying.20
That same day the INS conducted "area control operations" in Rochelle
that involved warrantless raids on dwellings and places of employment.
At 4:30 a.m. defendant Theodore Giorgetti, an INS employee, and
thirty-two armed agents began to enter dormitories and cottages where
employees of the Del Monte Food Company lived. In the two dormi-
tories where fifty-five female employees slept, the agents went from
room to room demanding that the women produce their papers. They
left the buildings without making any arrests.2' A raid of the cottages
where the male migrants lived followed the same pattern. One resi-
dent, unable to produce his green card evidencing legal residence, was
forced to follow the INS agents around on their search. He was re-
leased only when another Del Monte employee assured the agents that
the detained resident's papers were in order.22 Some time between 4:00
and 5:00 a.m., an INS agent went to a nearby farmhouse that was occu-
pied by Alonzo Solis, a migrant worker who was an American citizen.
The agent kicked on the door until Solis answered. When the agent tried
to force his way into the house the Solis' child began crying and Solis
ordered the agent out. Solis then showed his "certificate" to the agent
who, apparently satisfied, left.23
In addition to these searches of dwellings, a number of agents
showed up at two Del Monte plants. The two Del Monte supervisors,
believing they had to allow the agents in, allowed them to search the
plant. While there the agents questioned everyone who appeared to be of
Latin heritage. No arrests were made.2a
On the morning of September 26, Giorgetti and thirty agents made
a similar warrantless search of the Motor Wheel plant in Mendota,
Illinois. Nineteen employees were interviewed by Giorgetti and a num-
ber of them were arrested. The agents then went to several other tar-
gets in Mendota-industrial plants, hotels, boarding hpuses, and private
dwellings. Altogether 108 illegal aliens were arrested in Mendota. 
25
20. Id. at 890.
21. Id. at 889.
22. Id. at 889-90. The plight of the alien who becomes a migrant farmworker has its own
unique problems and characteristics, and is treated elsewhere. S. LAW, TlE RIGHTS OF- TII
POOR, 155-76 (1973); C. MCWILLIAMS, ILL FARES THE LAND: MIGRANTS AND MIGRATORY
LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES (1942); Rochin, Illegal Aliens in Agriculture: Some Theoretical
Considerations, 29 LAB. L.J. 149 (1978); Scher, Catz & Mathews, USDA: Agriculture at the E.-
pense of Small Farmers and Farmworkers, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 837 (1976); Scher & Catz, Farm.
worker Litigation Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: Establishing, Joint Employer Liability
and Related Problems, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 575, 594-95 (1975); Note, The Mexican
Farm Labor Importation Program-Review and Reform, 30 GEo. WA.II. L. Rev. 84 (1961); Note,
Statutory Provision for Admission of Mexican Agricultural Workers-An tvception to the Immni-
gration and Nationality Act of 1952, 24 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 464 (1956); Comment, Aliens in
the Fields: The "Green-Card Commuter" Under the Immigration and Naturalization Laws, 21
STAN. L. Rev. 1750 (1969).
23. Id. at 890.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 890-91. The district court termed INS conduct during the Rochelle and Mendota
(Vol. 39:66
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The district court also received into evidence an INS operation
manual and two supplements furnished by INS to its agents. The man-
ual was published in 1967, and the supplements in 1969 and 1971.26
The court considered these administrative guidelines relevant for deter-
mining whether INS embraced an official policy authorizing conduct in-
consistent with the fourth amendment.2 7  Because these operation man-
uals contained conflicting guidelines, 28 the court stated that "no find-
ing can be made other than agents are probably receiving misleading
and conflicting documents from the Service regarding the scope of their
authority. ' 29 The district court, however, concluded:
[T]he evidence shows that these guidelines are not being followed by the
officers in the field and the plaintiffs have established a reasonable prob-
ability that the misconduct is widespread and not the result of isolated
transgressions by a few agents. Thus, even if the written policy were con-
stitutionally adequate, the course of conduct in the field has been imper-
missible.3°
INS argued in district court that the random street stops and inter-
rogations of the plaintiffs were authorized by Section 287(a)(1) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act3e ' which empowers INS investigators
to question without warrant any person believed to be an alien concern-
ing his right to be in the United States. 32 The district court found that
plaintiffs "were singled out by the agents solely because they looked like
Mexicans . . 33 and the court stated that no act of Congress can
authorize constitutional violations.34 Thus, the court concluded that
applicable fourth amendment principles rendered the defendants' con-
duct illegal 5 and granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion.36 The terms of the injunction restrained INS from:
raids "the most egregious." Id. at 888. These extensive and costly operations were undertaken
based on the following information: a list of addresses where the illegal immigrants "might" be
found, furnished by the local police; a letter from the Chicago Tribune's "Action Expres"
regarding the employment of undocumented workers at the Motor Wheel Plant; and a list of
Mexicans working at the Motor Wheel Plant. Id.
26. Id. at 891, 902-03.
27. Id. at 902.
28. Id
29. Id. at 891. Defendant Georgetti testified that INS agents relied on the 1967 manual
daily. Id. This manual was written before Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and consequently gives the impression that INS agents may accost
any individual believed to be an alien as well as enter commercial premises without a warrant.
30. Id. at 903.
31. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (1976).
32. 398 F. Supp. at 891.
33. Id. at 893.
34. Id at 892 (citing Aimeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973)). For
law review articles discussing this case, see note 54 infra.
35. Id. at 899.
36. Id. at 903-04. In concluding that the plaintiffs had satisfied the requirements for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction the court noted that the evidence demonstrated plaintiffs
had a substantial likelihood of success on the merits and that there was a substantial likelihood
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(a) entering houses, dormitories, cottages or other dwellings situated
in the Northern District of Illinois which are occupied by plaintiffs or any
person of Mexican ancestry or of a Spanish surname who is, will be or has
been lawfully present in the Northern District of Illinois, unless they, pos-
sess a valid warrant to search or arrest, have probable cause to enter with-
out such warrant, or have received permission voluntarily given by one
lawfully entitled to give permission to enter;
(b) arresting, detaining, stopping and interrogating or otherwise in-
terfering with plaintiffs or any person of Mexican ancestry or of a Span-
ish surname who is, will be or has been lawfully present in the Northern
District of Illinois, unless they possess a valid warrant to search or arrest
such person, have probable cause to search or arrest such person without
such warrant, or have reasonable suspicion based on specific articulable
facts that such person is an alien unlawfully in the United States." 
7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit voted
to affirm the order of the district court by a vote of two to one. 8 Upon
rehearing en banc, however, the eight judges of the Seventh Circuit
were seriously divided. Three voted to affirm the district court order and
four voted to reverse and completely vacate the preliminary injunction.
One judge, however, voted to modify the injunction to permit INS
agents to question individuals co'ncerning their right to be in the United
States solely upon a reasonable belief that such persons are alien. This
modification prevailed, and the remainder of the district court's order
was affirmed by an equally divided court. 39 A determination of the con-
stitutionality of the INS actions was dependent on several United States
Supreme Court opinions dealing with analogous situations. For a full
understanding of the decisions in Illinois Migrant Council, these Su-
preme Court decisions will be analyzed in the following section.
III. INS AUTHORITY TO STOP AND INTERROGATE AND ITS
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
Section 287(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, provides
INS with authority to interrogate any person, whether an alien or a
citizen, for the purpose of determining an individual's right to enter the
United States.40 This section of the Act contains no requirement that the
future violations would occur, money damages were an inadequitc remedy, the preliminary
injunction would not adversely affect INS since they were "merely being ordered to conform
their conduct to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and the public interest would be
served by the injunction since the public interest requires "both enforcement of the immigration
laws and adherence to the Fourth Amendment."
37. Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062, 1067 (7th Cir. 1976) (emphasis
added), modified upon rehearing en bane, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977).
38. 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976), modified upon rehearing en bane, 548 F,2d 715 (7th
Cir. 1977).
39. Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977). Chief Judge Fairchild
and Judges Swygert and Cummings voted to affirm. Judges Tone, Pell and Dauer voted to
reverse. Judge Wood voted to vacate paragraph (b) of the preliminary injunction. There was a
majority for modification in the manner favored by Judge Wood.
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (1976).
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officer have a reasonable suspicion before a stop can be made since the
act of entering the country iself is sufficient reason to inquire about the
right to enter. This function may be performed either at a point along
an international border or at a functional equivalent of such a point.4
For example, St. Louis might be a port of entry for a flight originating
in another country and going directly to St. Louis. Also, an entry
checkpoint could be established several miles inland on a road that
could not have any domestic traffic. Thus, the criterion is not that the
checkpoint be directly on the border, but that those passing through
that checkpoint have come from another country. When a checkpoint
is established where a person passing through that point may have been
traveling solely within the United States, the authority of INS to stop
and question persons passing through that point becomes subject to
fourth amendment restrictions. 3
The authority of the INS to stop indiscriminately everyone who
enters the United States is the factor that distinguishes border opera-
tions from inland operations. A person who is entering the United
States seeks a benefit, the right of entry, and therefore voluntarily
consents to the requirements placed on receiving that benefit. 4  A per-
son already within the United States makes no such consent and is pro-
tected by the fourth amendment from unreasonable searches and
seizures. That person may or may not be an alien, and if an alien,
may or may not be illegally present in the United States. Were it not
for the protection from unreasonable searches and seizures provided by
the fourth amendment, any person who looked to an INS officer as if he
or she might be an alien would be subject to unlimited interrogations,
without reasonable suspicion, simply because of the detainee's physical
appearance. The provision of section 287(a)(1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act that permits INS officers to interrogate anyone without a
warrant must therefore be exercised within fourth amendment bounds
to prevent having citizens and lawful resident aliens repeatedly made
subject to violations of their rights solely on the basis of racial charac-
teristics.45
41. C. GORDON & H. ROSENFELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 3-161 to 3-167
(1977). Designated ports of entry for inspection are found in 8 C.F.R. § 100A(cXl977).
42. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)-(b) (1977).
43. United States v. Barbera, 514 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1975).
44. See United States v. King, 517 F.2d 350, 353 (5th Cir. 1975) (because travellers are
aware they may be subject to search, no reasonable expectation of privacy at border); United
States v. Weil, 432 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1970) (universally understood that those crossing
the border may be searched), cert. denied 401 U.S. 947 (1971). Similarly, courts permit routine
searches at airports because the serious threat of skyjacking provides an exigent circumstance
that makes it reasonable to suspend the warrant and probable cause requirements. See United
States v. Canada 527 F.2d 1374, 1378 (9th Cir. 1975) (consent implied because airport search
practices well known), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 895 (1975); United States v. Williams, 516 F.2d
11, 12 (2d Cir. 1975) (consent implied since defendant could have checked luggage rather than
carry it on board).
45. A 1970 study of the United States Commission on Civil Rights stated:
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The fourth amendment protects the right of the people to be secure
against arbitrary governmental interference with their privacy.46 The
amendment accomplishes this result by prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures and requiring that search warrants be based upon
probable cause.47  Although the amendment does not specifically pro-
hibit warrantless searches, searches conducted without a warrant are
generally presumed to be unreasonable.48 INS inspections, like other
searches, are limited by the fourth amendment's requirements as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court.
The power of government agents to interrogate persons concerning
their right to be present in the country and to conduct searches beyond
the border or its functional equivalent has long bee/i recognized by the
courts. In 1925 the United States Supreme Court recognized an excep-
tion to the probable cause requirement at the border:
Travellers may be so stopped [on the chance of finding something illegal
in each automobile] in crossing an international boundary .. .. But
those lawfully within the country . . . have a right to free passage with-
out interruption or search unless there is known to be a competent official
authorized to search, [and] probable cause for believing that their vehicles
are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.49
This statement clearly requires probable cause for the government to
search once a person is within the United States, but several federal
In the five Southwestern States which were the subject of t~iis study, the Commis-
sion heard frequent allegations that law enforcement officers discriminated against
Mexican Americans. Such discrimination includes more frequent use of excessive force
against Mexican Americans than against Anglos, discriminatory treatment of juveniles,
and harassment and discourteous treatment toward Mexican Americans in general.
Complaints also were heard that police protection in Mexican American neighborhoods
was less adequate than in other areas. The Commission's investigations showed that
belief in law enforcement prejudice is widespread and is indicative of a serious problem
of police-community relations between the police and Mexican Americans in the South-
west.
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEXICAN AMERICANS AND TIlE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICt
IN THE SOUTHWEST 13 (1970). See also, Greenfield & Kates, Mexican Americans, Racial
Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 662, 723-27 (1975). See
generally Munoz, The Right of an Illegal Alien to Maintain a Civil Action, 63 CALIF. L. RLV.
762 (1975); Scher & Catz, Farmworker Litigation Under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Estab-
lishing Joint Employer Liability and Related Problems, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rtv. 575 (1975).
Statements read at congressional hearings and debates relating to immigration have eharac-
terized Mexicans as bringing with them "ignorance, dirt, disease and vice, .... " Immigration
from Countries of the Western Hemisphere. Hearings Before the Comm. on Immunization and
Naturalization, 70th Cong., Ist Sess. 28 (1928) (remarks of Rep. Box;). See also 72 CONO. Ric.
7126 (1930) (remarks of Sen. Johnson); id. at 7215 (remarks of Sen. Heflin); Id. at 10844 (re-
marks of Rep. Almon).
46. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
47. Id.
48. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
49. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
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courts have relied on it to uphold INS activities away from the border.50
Prior to 1973 the lower federal courts consistently upheld warrant-
less INS searches within 100 miles of the border.5' The judicial atti-
tude seemed to be that the statutory authorization in section 287(a)(1)
provided a strong presumption of reasonableness under the fourth
amendment.52  The probable cause requirement for warrants was im-
posed stringently on conventional law enforcement officials to promote
reasonableness. INS searches, however, were accorded special treat-
ment because of the apparent statutory exception to the probable cause
requirement.53 This special treatment disappeared, however, when the
Supreme Court began to require that INS agents have probable cause,
or some level of suspicion below probable cause, before the agents
could make near-border searches.
A. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States
The Supreme Court first considered the issue of the constitution-
ality of extended border searches in Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States.54  The petitioner in Almeida-Sanchez was a Mexican citizen
who held a valid United States work permit. He was stopped by the
U.S. Border Patrol twenty-five air miles north of the Mexican border on
a road that did not cross the border and came no nearer to it than twenty
miles at any point. Although it was conceded by the government that
there was no probable cause to suspect that the petitioner had com-
50. See United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413
U.S. 919 (1973); United States v. McGlone, 394 F.2d 75, 78 (4th Cir. 1968); Thomas v. United
States, 372 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1967).
51. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2) (1977) defines reasonable distance from the border to mean
"within 100 air miles from any external boundary of the United States." See United States
v. Wright, 476 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1972) (search for aliens upon reasonable suspicion is consti-
tutional within a reasonable distance of the border), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); United
States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1972) (held search 7 miles from border to be rea-
sonable as authorized but withheld blanket approval of the 100-mile limit), cert. denied, 413
U.S. 919 (1973); Mienke v. United States, 452 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1971) (immigration searches
within 100 miles of border do not violate fourth amendment); Fernandez v. United States. 321
F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963) (stop for questioning within 100 miles was constitutional); United
States v. Correia, 207 F.2d 595 (3d Cir. 1953) (right to interrogate, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (1970),
is constitutional); Kelly v. United States, 197 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1952) (search for aliens at
checkpoint north of Florida Keys constitutional under the 1946 Act).
52. The general approach is best summarized by the Fifth Circuit's statement in Kelly v.
United States, 197 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1952): "Obviously there is a strong presumption of
constitutionality due to an Act of Congress, especially when the Act turns on %%hat is reason-
able . . ." But see United States v. Wright, 476 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1973) (requiring reasonable
suspicion to search), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129
(5th Cir. 1972) (withheld blanket approval of the 100-mile limit; some searches might not be
reasonable), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 919 (1973); Au Yi Lau v. United States Immigration &
Nat. Serv., 445 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (reasonable suspicion required for INS to forcibly stop
and interrogate), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971).
53. See Note, In Search of the Border: Searches Conducted by Federal Customs and Im-
migration Officers, 5 N.Y.U. J. INf'L L. & PoL 93 (1972).
54. 413 U.S. 266 (1973). See Sutis, The Ertent of the Border, 1 HASTINGS Co.sr. L. Q.
235 (1974); Comment, Extended Border Searches and Probable Cause: Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 1973 WASH. U. L Q. 889.
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mitted a crime, the border patrol conducted a thorough search of his
car and discovered marihuana, possessed in violation of federal law,
under the rear seat. In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court held
that the warrantless search made without probable cause or consent
violated the fourth amendment.
55
Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court, which ordered the evidence
suppressed and reversed the conviction, appeared to distinguish
between "roving patrols" and established border stations. In the latter
circumstance, the federal government was found to have the power to
exclude aliens by routine searches of individuals or vehicles without
probable cause or a search warrant "in certain circumstances . . . not
only at the border itself, but at its functional equivalents as well."' 56
Examples, given by the Court, of permissible warrantless searches
away from the actual border were searches made "at an established
station near the border, at a point marking the confluence of two or
more roads that extend from the border . . ."" and a search of passen-
gers and cargo arriving in the United States after a nonstop flight from
a foreign country. The majority, however, held that a "roving patrol"
could not stop an automobile and conduct a warrantless search unless
there was probable cause to believe that a crime was being committed. 8
Justice Powell, who joined with four other members of the Court to
form the majority in Almeida-Sanchez, wrote a concurring opinion that
increased the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of the Court's opin-
ion. He suggested that under certain circumstances, not met in this
case, roving patrols would be constitutional, thus negating the Court's
emphasis on the need for established stations. 59 Justice Powell sought
to reconcile law enforcement needs with constitutionally protected
rights. He suggested that the probable cause requirement might be
met by knowledge of an area rather than by information relating to
specific vehicles or persons. 60  He compared the problem of enforcing
the immigration laws to the problem of enforcing municipal housing
codes and cited Camara v. Municipal Court,6' in which the Court found
55. 413 U.S. at 273.
56. 413 U.S. at 272.
57. Id. at 273.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 279 (Powell, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 283-84.
61. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See Greenberg, The Balance of Interest Theorv and the Fourth
Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See. 61 CAL, L,
REv. 1011 (1973); LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: Vic Camara
and See Cases, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
In Camara, the Court held the fourth amendment warrant requirement applicable to muni-
cipal housing inspections of private residences, finding that nonconsensual warrantless searches
of private property were unreasonable except in carefully defined circumstances, 387 U,S,, at
528-29. The Court explicitly rejected the contention that broad statutory limitations on in-
spections provide sufficient constitutional safeguards, concluding that such limitations are all
inadequate substitute for the individualized review required by the fourth amendment, hl at
[Vol. 39:66
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that the probable cause requirement could be met for periodic housing
inspections by basing the request for a search warrant on knowledge of
an area rather than of specific buildings. Justice Powell argued from
Camara that roving border searches could be sustained on the basis of
the same knowledge of an area rather than of specific vehicles or per-
sons. As justification for such searches, he noted the impossibility of pa-
trolling the entire border with fixed stations and the high concentration
of illegal aliens present in the area.62 The search of an automobile was
found to be "far less intrusive on the rights protected by the Fourth
Amendment than the search of one's person or a building."63 In a con-
clusion supported by the four dissenting Justices-Chief Justice Burger,
and Justices White, Blackmun and Rehnquist-Justice Powell stated
that "on appropriate facts the Government can satisfy the probable
cause requirement for a roving search in a border area without posses-
sing information about particular automobiles . . ... 64 Justice Powell
suggested that the interests of protecting individual rights and yet
serving law enforcement needs could best be met by giving the border
patrol authority to obtain area search warrants similar to those available
to the building inspectors in Camara. These search warrants would be
"justified by experience with obviously non-mobile sections of a partic-
ular road or area embracing several roads."65 He concluded:
Nothing in the papers before us demonstrates that it would not be feasible
for the Border Patrol to obtain advance judicial approval of the decision to
conduct roving searches on a particular road or roads for a reasonable
period of time. According to the Government, the incidence of illegal
533. If inspections were permitted without a warrant, the Court reasoned, citizens %ould
have no way of knowing whether the inspections were required by the housing code or
whether the inspector was acting within the scope of his authority. Id. at 532. The uncontrolled
discretion to search was exactly the kind of action that the fourth amendment search %arrant
requirement was meant to circumscribe. Absent allegations that an inspection program could
not achieve its goals within the framework of a reasonable warrant requirement. the Court
concluded, the fourth amendment prohibits the warrantless inspections. Id. at 533.
In See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), a companion case to Camara. the Court
extended the fourth amendment's protection against .arrantless municipal inspections to
nonpublic businesses, id. at 545-46, enunciating a flexible standard of probable cause, that
requires consideration of the public's interest in the effective enforcement of the particular
regulation. Id. at 545. The Court pointed out, however, that a magistrate may reasonably per-
mit inspection of business premises in more situations than he may approve inspection of pri% ate
residences, id. at 545-46, because the element of surprise is more often the crucial factor in
business inspections. Id. at 545 n.6.
Recently in Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978), the United States Supreme
Court held, relying on Camara and See, that a warrantless inspection of business premises under-
taken pursuant to section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970. 29
U.S.C. § 657(a) (1970), which empowers federal OSHA agents of the Secretary of Labor to search
work areas of any employment facility within OSHA's jurisdiction for safety hazards and %iola-
tions of OSHA regulations, violates the fourth amendment. Under this holding the dragnet-war-
rantless raids of the employment centers of the migrant farmworkers and factory uorkers in
Rochelle and Mendota, Illinois would clearly violate the fourth amendment.
62. 413 U.S., at 276 (Powell, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 279.
64. id. at 281.
65. Id. at 282.
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transportation of aliens on certain roads is predictable, and the roving
searches are apparently planned in advance or carried out according to a
predetermined schedule. The use of area warrant procedure would surely
not "frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search." . .. It
would of course entail some inconvenience, but inconvenience alone has
never been thought to be an adequate reason for abrogating the warrant
requirement ...
While admitting that the standards in the majority opinion in
Almeida-Sanchez for determining probable cause were "relatively un-
structured," Justice Powell suggested the following factors be consid-
ered in determining whether sufficient cause exists for issuance of an
area search warrant:
(i) the frequency with which aliens illegally in the country are known or
reasonably believed to be transported within a particular area; (ii) the
proximity of the area in question to the border; (iii) the extensiveness and
geographic characteristics of the area, including the roads therein and the
extent of their use; and (iv) the probable degree of interference with the
rights of innocent persons, taking into account the scope of the proposed
search, its duration, and the concentration of illegal alien traffic in relation
to the general traffic of the road or area.67
Justice Powell's concurring opinion stressed that the "novelty" of the
type of search conducted by roving patrols does not lessen the impor-
tance of prior judicial determination as to the nature and scope of the
search.68
The dissenting opinion by Justice White agreed with Justice
Powell's observation that searches by roving patrols, if authorized by an
area search warrant issued on less than probable cause, would satisfy
fourth amendment requirements.69 Justice White disagreed, however,
with Justice Powell's and the majority's holding that either a warrant
or probable cause were required in the circumstances of this case. He
saw this holding as in conflict with the legislative judgment in section
287 of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
that for purposes of enforcing the immigration laws it is reasonable to
treat the exterior boundaries of the country as a zone, not a line, and that
there are recurring circumstances in which the search of vehicular traffic
without warrant and without probable cause may be reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment although not carried out at the border itself.70
The decision left the status of roving patrol searches in border areas
in doubt. While five members of the Court held such a warrantless
search to be invalid without probable cause, one member of the major-
66. Id. at 283 (footnote omitted).
67. Id. at 283-284 (footnote omitted).
68. Id. at 284.
69. Id. at 288 (White, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 294 (White, J., dissenting).
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ity, with the support of the four dissenters, would permit such searches
if authorized by an area search warrant issued on a showing of less than
traditional probable cause. The four-member minority would permit
such searches without warrants or probable cause. Thus, a majority of
the Court would appear to support the constitutionality of "roving"
patrols if prior judicial approval is given to the nature and scope of the
search by issuance of an area search warrant.
B. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and United States v. Ortiz
The primary question raised by the Alneida-Sanchez decision was
how far it would be applied. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,7 l
the Court examined the issue whether the border patrol could use a
roving patrol to stop cars and question occupants about their citizen-
ship and immigration status in areas near the border. In Brignoni-
Ponce, a fixed checkpoint south of San Clemente, California, had been
closed because of inclement weather. In place of the checkpoint, the
border patrol stationed an off-highway patrol car from which two officers
observed traffic. The respondent was stopped because the car's occu-
pants appeared to be of Mexican descent. Upon questioning, the offi-
cers learned that the occupants of the car were aliens who had entered
the country illegally. The respondent was charged with and convicted
of knowingly transporting illegal aliens.7 2 On appeal, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals found that the stop resembled a roving patrol and
applied the ruling of Almeida-Sanchez. The Ninth Circuit held that
while Mexican ancestry could be considered with other factors in form-
ing a degree of suspicion sufficient to make a stop, it alone did not
amount to a "founded suspicion" necessary to support the warrantless
stop of the automobile.73
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the court of appeals, but
split on theories to support its decision. 4 Justice Powell's opinion for
the Court, which was joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall
and Rehnquist, applied a balancing test to determine the reasonable-
ness of the warrantless search. The majority stated that the fourth
amendment applies to all seizures of persons including brief detentions
short of arrest and requires such seizures to be reasonable. The Court
then defined its balancing test: "As with other categories of police
action subject to Fourth Amendment constraints, the reasonableness
of such seizures depends on a balance between the public interest and
the individuars right to personal security free from arbitrary interfer-
71. 422 U.S., 873 (1975). See Note, Almeida-Sanchez and its Progeny. The Developing
Border Zone Search Law, 17 ARIz. L. REv. 214 (1975); Note, 13 Hous. L RE%,. 200 (1975).
72. 422 U.S. at 874-75.
73. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F.2d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1974).
74. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S., 873 (1975).
75. Id. at 878.
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ence by law officers."" After discussing the public interest in control-
ling the large-scale illegal entry of unauthorized aliens at the Mexican
border, the difficulty of enforcing the law along a long border, and the
use of illegal aliens as a source for cheap labor, and comparing these
public concerns with the interference with individual liberty involved in
stopping and questioning persons suspected of being illegal aliens, the
Court concluded that the search involved constituted a "modest intru-
sion. 76 In view of the limited nature of the intrusion, the Court found
that stops of this nature could be justified on a finding of less than
probable cause and applied the standard set forth in Terry v. Ohio.77
In Terry the Supreme Court had utilized a balancing test to uphold
a temporary police seizure-stop and frisk-of individuals for the pur-
pose of questioning on less than probable cause to arrest, since the
intrusion on personal privacy was less than that which accompanies an
arrest. 78 The Court, however, emphatically condemned "intrusions upon
constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial
than inarticulate hunches. 79  In order to justify a seizure, a law
enforcement agent "must be able to point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion." 80 General or class suspicion there-
fore was not sufficient.
Applying the Terry balancing test, the Court in Brignoni-Ponce
said:
In this case .... because of the importance of the governmental inter-
est at stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of prac-
tical alternatives for policing the border, we hold that when an officer's
observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may
contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car
briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion. As in
Terry, the stop and inquiry must be "reasonably related in scope to the
justification for their initiation" . . . . The officer may question the driver
and passengers about their citizenship and immigration status, and he
may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further de-
tention or search must be based on consent or probable cause."
The Court held that brief border stops, like stop and frisk stops,
could be made if the officer has reasonable suspicion, which requires less
evidence than probable cause, to believe that he has apprehended an
illegal alien or a person transporting illegal aliens. 8' The Court refused,
76. Id. at 880.
77. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry,
Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MicH. L. REv. 40 (1968). See also, Note, 47 TaX. L. RLv. 138
(1968).
78. 392 U.S., at 21-27.
79. Id. at 22.
80. Id. at 21.
81. 422 U.S., at 881-82 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 884.
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however, to give the government the broad discretion it had sought. It
found that current regulations permitting such random stops within an
area 100 miles from the border would substantially interfere with legiti-
mate traffic and would be an infringement of individual freedom not
justified by the relatively small percentage of the population engaged in
illegal entry or transportation of aliens.8 3 In dictum, the Court seemed
to reach beyond the automobile stops to place restraints on stopping
and questioning individuals not in vehicles: "For the same reasons
that the Fourth Amendment forbids stopping vehicles at random to
inquire if they are carrying aliens who are illegally in the country, it also
forbids stopping or detaining persons for questioning about their citi-
zenship on less than a reasonable suspicion that they may be aliens.""
In further defining the limitations on roving border patrols origi-
nally set forth in Almeida-Sanchez, the Court held that, except for
searches actually made at the border or its functional equivalent, roving
patrols "may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable
facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reason-
ably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be
illegally in the country."8 5 The Court noted several factors that could
be considered in determining whether there was enough suspicion to
permit a border officer to stop a person for brief questioning. One is
the nature of the area in which the vehicle has been encountered, tak-
ing into consideration its proximity to the border and past experience
with alien traffic in the area. Other factors that could be considered
are information about recent illegal crossings made in the area, the
behavior of the driver, and whether the vehicle appears to be heavily
loaded. While foreign appearance could be a factor to be considered,
the Supreme Court held that foreign appearance alone is insufficient to
create the reasonable belief necessary to stop a person away from the
border and question him concerning his nationality. 6 In discussing the
particular facts of Brignoni-Ponce, the Court attributed significance to
the brief period of time that the officers had to observe the respondent
and to the large number of Mexican-Americans and legally present
Mexican aliens in the area. Even though the officers did apprehend
illegal aliens, the stop was unlawful because the officers could cite no
83. Id. at 882-83.
84. Id. at 884.
85. Id. One commentator has criticized the "reasonable suspicion" standard because the
"probable cause" standard is the more appropriate standard to insure protection of citizens and
lawful resident aliens from INS harassment:
Brignoni-Ponce authorized roving units of the Border Patrol to conduct interrogation
stops based on "reasonable suspicion." It ignored the fact that approval of this low
standard of certitude would increase the proportion of erroneous intrusions, and that
Mexican-Americans, because their apparent Mexican ancestry is a relevant evidenti-
ary factor, would bear the brunt of these errors.
Comment, Minority Groups and the Fourth Amendment Standard of Certitude: United States
v. Ortiz and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 732, 762-63 (1976).
86. 422 U.S. at 885-86.
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reason other than the appearance of the occupants for initially stopping
the vehicle.
87
The Court offered a suggestion for corrective legislation that would
allow the INS to perform its function consistent with the fourth amend-
ment. The majority opinion suggested the possibility of area search
warrants, a point first raised in Almeida-Sanchez. In a footnote, the
Court seemed to go out of its way to indicate that, since there was no
warrant involved in this case, the Court would not have to consider the
issue of "whether a warrant could be issued to sto' cars in a designated
area on the basis of conditions in the area as a whole and in the absence
of reason to suspect that any particular car is carrying aliens."8
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred only
in the result reached by the Court. His opinion complained that the
Court's interpretation of the fourth amendment would leave the INS
"powerless to stop the tide of illegal aliens-and dangerous drugs-that
daily and freely crosses our 2,000 mile southern boundary.""9  Com-
menting on the Court's balancing test, the Chief Justice expressed the
fear that "history may view us as prisoners of our own traditional and
appropriate concern for individual rights, unable-or unwilling-to apply
the concept of reasonableness explicit in the Fourth Amendment in
order to develop a rational accommodation between those rights and
the literal safety of the country." 90 He warned that in the absence of
legislative action, presumably to permit area search warrants, the
United States border could be protected only by a massive force of
guards. The opinion concluded with the view that the Court had not
given adequate weight to the needs of the society in balancing its
interest against the rights of individuals. 91 An appendix accompanying
the Chief Justice's opinion provided a comprehensive report on the law
enforcement problems created by illegal aliens.
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion reached a conclusion opposite to
that of the Chief Justice. He recalled his dissent from the "suspicion
test" when it was first articulated in Terry and called the adoption of a
standard permitting less than probable cause "an unjustified weakening
of the Fourth Amendment's protection of citizens from arbitrary inter-
ference by the police., 92 Justice Douglas would have either discon-
tinued use of the "suspicion test" or limited its application to violent
crimes. His opinion warned:
[B]y specifying factors to be considered [in applying the "suspicion test"]
without attempting to explain what combination is necessary to satisfy
87. Id.
88. Id. at 882 n.7.
89. Id. at 899 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 900.
92. Id. at 888 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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the test, the Court may actually induce the police to push its language
beyond intended limits and to advance as a justification any of the enu-
merated factors even where its probative significance is negligible.93
In yet another concurring opinion, Justice White joined by Justice
Blackmun followed the theme set by Chief Justice Burger. Justice
White lamented what he saw as the Court's "dismantling" of machinery
to intercept illegal aliens. He viewed this result, however, as possibly
beneficial to law enforcement. The system of border patrols was seen
as
notably unsuccessful in deterring or stemming this heavy flow [of illegal
aliens]: and its costs, including added burdens on the courts have been
substantial. Perhaps the Judiciary should not strain to accommodate the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the needs of a system which
at best can demonstrate only minimal effectiveness as long as it is lawful
for business firms and others to employ aliens who are illegally in the
country.
94
The opinion went on to state that the problem of illegal aliens was best
left to the President and Congress to resolve.95
Justice Rehnquist, who was apparently also concerned by the ad-
verse effect that the restrictive ruling might have on law enforcement,
wrote a concurring opinion to stress that Brignoni-Ponce should be con-
sidered as a limited decision, concerned only with roving border patrol
stops of immigrants. He stressed that it would not interfere with the
long-established practice by highway patrolmen of stopping persons
believed to be in violation of motor vehicle laws. In his view, agricul-
tural inspections and highway roadblocks to apprehend known fugitives
would also be unaffected.96
Also decided on the last day of the 1974-75 Term was United States
v. Ortiz,97 which presented the issue whether vehicle searches at traffic
checkpoints away from the border, similar in nature to roving patrol
searches, must be based on probable cause. In Ortiz the respondent's
car had been stopped, although the officers had no reason to believe that
it contained illegal aliens. The checkpoint, which screened all traffic
when it was open, was sixty-two air miles from the Mexican border at a
place that could not be considered to be the functional equivalent of a
border. At the checkpoint, drivers and passengers were asked ques-
tions about their citizenship; if anything suspicious was observed, the
officers might "inspect" areas of the vehicle in which aliens could hide.
Similar operations had been conducted at other permanent traffic
checkpoints, but where traffic was heavy, only random stops were made.
93. Id. at 890.
94. Id. at 915 (White, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 915.
96. Id. at 887-88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
97. 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
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The government argued that these checkpoints could be distin-
guished from the roving patrols that had been limited by Almeida-
Sanchez. The checkpoint officers' discretion in deciding what vehicles
would be searched was limited by the location of the checkpoints, a
policy decision made by officials who considered factors such as the in-
convenience to the public, safety, and the potential for apprehending
illegal aliens. These checkpoints were said to be less intrusive than
roving patrol searches because they were placed on well-traveled
roads, were well-marked and lighted, and were less likely to frighten
motorists. 9s
Justice Powell's opinion for the Court, which was joined by Jus-
tices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Rehnquist, found that
there was no difference, so far as probable cause requirements were
concerned, between a roving patrol and a traffic checkpoint removed
from the border.99 While the lighting and warning given might make
a difference with regard to the propriety of the stop, it made no differ-
ence as to the search itself. The Court stated that search at such a
checkpoint, despite the greater regularity of the stop itself, could result
in the same degree of embarrassment to the persons searched as a rov-
ing search.'O Furthermore, the Court found that the officers' discretion
was not significantly limited beyond that of the roving patrol since only
three percent of the passing cars were actually stopped and no more
than ten or fifteen percent of those stopped were actually searched.
This left the officer with substantial discretion to determine the cars he
would search, a determination that would never have to be justified.",
The Court concluded:
This degree of discretion to search private autornobiles is not consis-
tent with the Fourth Amendment. A search, even of an automobile, is a
substantial invasion of privacy. To protect that privacy from official arbi-
trariness, the Court always has regarded probable cause as the minimum
requirement for a lawful search ...We are not persuaded that the dif-
ferences between roving patrols and traffic checkpoints justify dispensing
in this case with the safeguards we required in Ahneida-Sanchez. We
therefore follow that decision. 02
In a footnote, the Court once again specifically stated that it had not
ruled on the possibility of area searches because there had been no war-
rant in the case and the government had not attempted to obtain one.
In the same footnote, the Court also indicated that the scope of its
holding might be limited: "Not every aspect of a routine automobile
98. Id. at 894-95.
99. Id. at 896-97.
100. Id. at 895.
101. Id. at 896.
102. Id. at 896 (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 897 n.3.
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'inspection' . ..necessarily constitutes a 'search' for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. There is no occasion in this case to define the
exact parameters of an automobile 'search'."' °4
Justice Rehnquist, in his concurring opinion, stated that the Court's
analysis of the distinction between roving and fixed checkpoint searches
was correct but questioned the soundness of the rule in Almeida-San-
chez. He stressed the limited nature of the Court's opinion by pointing to
the fact that it applied only to full searches and not to mere stops that
"involve only a modest intrusion, are not likely to be frightening or
significantly annoying, are regularized by the fixed situs, and effec-
tively serve the important national interest in controlling illegal
entry." lo' He would have held such stops to be reasonable whether or
not accompanied by "reasonable suspicion" and would have limited the
Court's requirement for suspicion to instances where a search is actually
made. He announced that his understanding of the decision was that
such stops would not be prohibited if unaccompanied by a search.
106
C. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte,10 7 in an apparent concession to the eroding power of INS en-
forcement, preserved the border patrol's right to conduct routine stops
of vehicles at permanent checkpoints within 100 miles of the border
without warrant, probable cause, or even individualized suspicion.
The consolidated cases involved routine stops at immigration check-
points to inquire about citizenship and illegal alienage. The stops re-
sulted in several arrests for transporting illegal aliens. 10 Because of
the large amount of traffic at INS checkpoints, INS officials screened
vehicles through lanes and selected automobiles for referrals to a sec-
ondary area where an interrogation was conducted. t' 9 None of the
challenged stops at the checkpoints involved suspicion based on any
articulable facts; the illegal aliens were discovered during an interro-
104. Id.
105. Id. at 898-99 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
106. Id.
107. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
108. The respondent was charged, inter alia, with two counts of violating 8 U.S.C. § 1324
(a) (2). That section provides for the felony conviction of any person wsho:
knowing that he is in the United States in violation of law, and knowing or having
reasonable grounds to believe that his last entry into the United States occurred less
than three years prior thereto, transports, or moves, or attempts to transport or move,
within the United States by means of transportation or otherwise, in furtherance of
such violation of law [any alien not lawfully entitled to enter or reside iithin the
United States].
109. According to the Court fewer than one percent of the vehicles passing through the
San Clemente checkpoint were stopped and interrogated. 428 U.S. at 563 n.16.
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gation of the passengers that resulted from the referral to the secon-
dary checkpoint area.
In a seven to two decision upholding this INS enforcement technique,
the Supreme Court held that properly limited vehicle stops for ques-
tioning, made at reasonably located permanent checkpoints, did not
violate the fourth amendment." 0 The Court found the interest of INS
in apprehending aliens great but the intrusion on fourth amendment
rights minimal."' It held that no particularized ground was needed
to conduct checkpoint stops." 2  The Court concluded that checkpoint
stops need not be justified by warrant, probable cause, or individual-
ized suspicion, and that referrals to the secondary area could be made
on the basis of the occupant's apparent heritage because "the Fourth
Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such [individual-
ized] suspicion"'" 3 to conduct a search or seizure. The Court permitted
latino appearance to justify referral to the secondary area, reasoning that
INS must be permitted wide discretion in selecting vehicles for further
inspection and that selective referrals may actually advance fourth
amendment interests by minimizing interference with the rights of the
general public.
In light of the prior decisions restricting INS enforcement powers
in Almeida-Sanchez, Brignoni-Ponce, and Ortiz, the Court's apparent
retreat in Martinez-Fuerte must be viewed as a surprise. The leap from
a strict probable cause standard for checkpoint searches in Ortiz to the
abandonment of any fourth amendment requirements in Martinez-
Fuerte is an unprincipled result, motivated by the majority's effort to
give some regard to the enforcement problems of the INS."
t4
IV. A CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD FOR
INS "AREA CONTROL" OPERATIONS
In Illinois Migrant Council the district court had to apply the prin-
ciples of these search and seizure cases to street encounters and to raids
on dwellings and places of employment in Illinois. Looking first at
street encounters, the court applied the holding of Brignoni-Ponce that
Mexican appearance alone was insufficient cause for an INS stop. The
110. Factors to be considered in weighing the reasonableness of the location of a given
checkpoint included the number of arrests made at the checkpoint and compliance with the
border patrol's own criteria for an effective location (e.g., that it is near the confluence of
significant roads leading away from the border, that it is beyond the twenty-five mile area in
which temporary border passes are valid, that it is in a location minimizing interference with
legitimate traffic, and that it is situated where the topography restricts vehicle circumvention
of the checkpoint). Id. at 562 n.15.
11l. Id. at 556-57.
112. Id. at 563.
113. Id. at 561.
114. See generally Comment, Alien Checkpoints and the Troublesome Tetralogy: Uni-
ted States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 14 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 257 (1976).
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court announced the following standard for street interrogation by INS
agents: "[A]n INS agent must reasonably suspect on the basis of spe-
cific articulable facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that a
person is an alien illegally in the country before the agent may stop
and interrogate that person pursuant to the authority of Section 1357(a)(1) [287(a)(1)]. ' ' n15
The court reasoned that if INS agents cannot stop a vehicle near
the border merely because it is occupied by persons of Mexican ances-
try, then "[a] fortiori, INS agents cannot stop a vehicle in the Northern
District of Illinois merely because its occupants appear to be of Mexi-
can ancestry."" 6  In both geographical areas "the agents must rea-
sonably suspect that the vehicle contains illegal aliens."
' 17
The district court concluded that the same rule applies when the
INS target is a pedestrian. The court pointed out that while automobile
travel has become an essential part of our freedom to travel, it would be
anomalous to grant the automobile driver greater freedom of movement
than afforded the pedestrian.
Indeed, to the extent that differing Fourth Amendment standards have
developed among persons, places, and vehicles, the less stringent have
been applied to vehicles because of the exigent circumstances inherent
in their operation. . . .Therefore, if as Brignoni-Ponce holds, a vehicle
cannot be stopped unless the agent reasonably suspects that it contains
aliens illegally in the country, a person should not be stopped unless the
agent reasonably suspects that he or she is an alien illegally in the coun-
try. 
8
The question of the raids on dwellings and places of employment
was a relatively simple one. The district court noted that it was not
difficult to resolve the question posed by the warrantless entries and
searches of plants, dormitories and homes during the area control
operations in Rochelle and Mendota." 9 When the government seeks to
justify a search on the basis of consent, said the court, it has the burden
of establishing that the consent was fully and voluntarily given.'20 The
court went on to say that "[iut would be hypocrisy of the lowest order to
hold that the knocks on the doors of the Del Monte dormitories and
cottages and the Solis residence produced consent 'voluntarily given
and not the result of duress or coercion.' ,,2
Because fourth amendment rights cannot be asserted vicari-
115. Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 398 F. Supp. 882, 899 (N.D. I11. 1975) (emphasis
added).
116. Id. at 898.
117. Id.
118. Id. (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 899.
120. IiL at 900 (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968) and Schneck-
loth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S., 218, 248-249 (1973)).
121. Id. at 900 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,248-249 (1973)).
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ously, 122 however, the district court held that the individual plaintiffs
did not have standing to challenge the unconsented entries of INS
agents into the factories where they worked. 123 The court said, how-
ever, that the individual plaintiffs did have standing to complain of
what happened to them and to members of their class once INS agents
entered the factories. 124 The court then pointed out that the systematic
interrogation of workers of apparent Mexican ancestry in a plant
setting regarding their citizenship 25 is no different than stopping and
questioning them on the street.126 Here, too, the district court applied
principles of Brignoni-Ponce holding INS intcrrogations justifiable
only when an agent has a reasonable suspicion based on specific artic-
ulable facts that the individual questioned is unlanfully in the United
States.12
7
The evidence before the district court plainly showed that it was
INS policy to seize individuals solely because they were non-white
and did not speak English. These facts made it clear to the court that
Brignoni-Ponce's holding-that mere appearance of Mexican ancestry
is insufficient to justify INS stops near the border 2 -should be extended
to require a reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage for urban interroga-
tions as well. To reach this conclusion, however, the district court
needed to distinguish two decisions of the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit 29 construing the authority of INS agents to stop and interrogate
persons of apparent Chinese descent.
The District of Columbia Circuit's interpretation of section 287
(a)(1) drew a distinction between "mere questioning" that proceeds
on the basis of "the individual's cooperation"'130 and "forcible deten-
tions of a temporary nature for the purposes of interrogation."'' For
"mere questioning" it was required that the INS agent have a reason-
able suspicion that the subject of questioning is "of alien origin,"' 132
while temporary "forcible detention," according to the court, required a
reasonable suspicion that the detainee was "illegally in the country."'133
After careful study, the Illinois district court found the formula




126. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
127. 398 F. Supp. at 900.
128. 422 U.S., at 882-84.
129. Cheung Tin Wong v. INS, 468 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Au Yi Lau v. INS, 445 F.2d
217 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971). See also Shu Fuk Cheung v. INS, 476 F.2d
1180 (8th Cir. 1973).
130. Au Yi Lau v. INS, 445 F.2d 217, 222 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 404 U.S., 864 (1971).
131. Id. at 223.
132. Id. at 222.
133. Id. at 223.
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developed by the District of Columbia Circuit "not realistic or condu-
cive to the preservation of fourth amendment rights."'3 4 The court
explained:
The line between mere questioning and forcible detention is faint
and too easily crossed. . . . Implicit in the introduction of the agent and
the initial questioning is a show of authority to which the average person
encountered will feel obliged to stop and respond. Few will feel that they
can walk away or refuse to answer. And if they should, Larry Sandoval's
experience teaches the consequences. He was grabbed and placed in
the agents' car to be taken "to Chicago."' 35
There is strong support for the district court's rejection of the dis-
tinction between "mere questioning" and "forcible detention." Al-
though the District of Columbia Circuit explicitly adopted the Terry
reasonable suspicion standard, it apparently ignored what, according
to Terry, constitutes a seizure. Terry held that "whenever a police
officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he
has 'seized' that person." 36  The evidence before the district court
demonstrated that there is no such thifig as an INS agent's "mere
questioning" about national origin or documents. Once approached by
INS there is no freedom to walk away; the person has been "seized,"
according to Terry. If a reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage was
required by the District of Columbia Circuit for INS interrogations
because there was a "seizure," then the same standard must be applied
to stops that the District of Columbia court termed "mere questioning."
Further, the reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage requirement of
Illinois Migrant Council is more equitable than the District of Columbia
Circuit's mere alienage standard. Mere suspicion of alienage can arise
too easily from racial and cultural characteristics and from the impres-
sions of INS agents trained to doubt the citizenship of certain people.
In sum, the district court held that in order to comply with the
fourth amendment, INS stops and interrogations conducted pursuant to
section 287(a)(1) must be based upon a reasonable suspicion that the
individual is an alien illegally in the country.137 The court's objection
to the District of Columbia Circuit's "mere questioning" and "forcible
detention" distinction is legally sound as it accurately reflects the defi-
nition of seizure articulated in Terry. It should also be noted that the
district court's reasonable-suspicion-of-illegal-alienage standard offers
more protection to the rights of millions of Mexican-Americans and
Spanish-surnamed persons who are legally present in the United
States.
134. 398 F. Supp. at 898-99.
135. Id. at 899.
136. 392 U.S. at 16.
137. 398 F. Supp. at 899-900.
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In a two to one decision the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals voted
to affirm the district court's requirement that all INS stops be based on a
reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is unlawfully in the United
States.138  Upon rehearing en banc, however, the Seventh Circuit
modified the district court standard so that suspicion of alienage alone
would suffice to justify an INS stop for questioning. 39
The first indication that the district court standard would eventually
be modified came in a footnote to the original Seventh Circuit opin-
ion. 40  The majority there noted that the district court specifically
enjoined INS from "arresting, detaining, stopping, and interrogating
persons of Mexican ancestry."' 4' The majority explained that this was
in accord with the District of Columbia Circuit rule that required a rea-
sonable suspicion of illegal alienage for INS interrogation.44 The court
added that it did not understand the district court injunction to pro-
hibit INS agents from engaging in "casual conversation" with an indi-
vidual when the individual cooperates with the investigating officer.4
Further, the footnote embraced the portion of the District of Columbia
Circuit standard that required suspicion of illegal alienage without re-
jecting the standard's first tier that permits questioning solely upon a
suspicion of alienage.
This footnote laid the foundation for the en bane modification that
permitted INS to question an individual concerning his right to be in the
United States solely upon a reasonable suspicion of alienage. 14 4 This
modification is apparently based on the fact that the majority in the
footnote permitted "casual conversation" when the individual was
cooperating, but required-as did the district court-a reasonable sus-
picion of illegal alienage for further interrogation. 14
5
The footnote was added in response to the dissent's full approval
of the District of Columbia Circuit's two-tiered standard for questioning
and interrogation.146  The dissent argued, and the majority apparently
agreed, that questioning does not amount to a constitutional deprivation
because the minimal invasion of privacy for the individual is justified by
the special needs of immigration officials to make such interrogations. 14'The majority followed the district court's application and extension
138. Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976), modified upon
rehearing en banc, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977).
139. 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977). See note 39 supra.
140. 540 F.2d at 1070 n.10.
141. Id.




145. Id. at 1063.




of Brignoni-Ponce148  The majority referred to one commentator who
agreed with the standard of justification for street stops adopted by the
district court,1 49 and added a few approving citations. On the whole,
however, the majority followed the district court "without much dis-
cussion."50 The cursory treatment given Brignoni-Ponce by the major-
ity was surprising because its "reasonable suspicion" standard for alien
searches had recently been drawn into question by the Supreme Court.
While the appeal from the district court in Illinois Migrant Council was
being considered by the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court announced
its decision in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte.t'5  As previously
noted, the holding in Martinez-Fuerte appears to be inconsistent with
previous rulings regarding searches and seizures by immigration au-
thorities because no quantum of suspicion was required.1
5 2
As authority for the proposition that the fourth amendment does
not impose an "irreducible requirement of such suspicion,' t  the Mar-
tinez-Fuerte Court cited Camara v. Municipal Court.5 4 Arguably, INS
urban inquiries regarding citizenship involve factors analogous to those
in Camara.155  The dissent, however, failed to mention Martinez-Fuerte
and the majority dealt with it swiftly: "What ruling is explicitly
limited by the Court to those intrusions at permanent check points .. .
because of the limited nature of the intrusion and the regularity of the
exercise of authority. Martinez-Fuerte therefore does not apply either
to searches of dwellings or street stops of individuals."'
5 6
148. Id. at 1070.
149. "While Brignoni-Ponce reserved the question of whether the suspicion must be of
illegal alienage since the facts did not require such decision, the language used in the text
continued to phrase the standard in terms of illegal alienage." Id. at 1070 n.8 (citing Note,
Reasonable Suspicion of Illegal Alienage as a Precondition to 'Stops' of Suspected Aliens, 52
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 485, 497 (1975)).
150. 540 F.2d at 1076 (Tone, J., dissenting).
151. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). The Seventh Circuit heard oral arguments on April 29. 1976 and
handed down its first decision on August 17, 1976. The Supreme Court announced its decision
in M artinez-Fuerte on July 6, 1976.
152. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S., at 569-70. (dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Brennan in which Mr. Justice Marshall joined). The decisions to which the dissent
referred are Almeida-Sanchez, Ortiz, and Brignoni-Ponce. For a detailed criticism of Martinez-
Fuertes, see Comment, supra note 114.
153. 428 U.S., at 561.
154. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
155. Concern that Martinez-Fuerte could be extended to INS street stops is based on
the Court's acceptance of Justice Powell's notion of a "functional equivalent of probable
cause." This concept first appeared in Powell's concurring opinion in Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973). There he said that in some limited circumstances
there may exist a constitutionally adequate equivalent of probable cause to conduct roving
vehicle searches in the vicinity of the border as some form of judicial warrant from Camara.
It would seem that the Court might approve Camara warrants for area control operations if
the political and economic needs of the moment demanded it. For the present, though, it ap-
pears that the reasonable suspicion standard for alien searches is on firm ground. For further
discussion on this question see, Note, Area Search Warrants in Border Zones: Almeida-San-
chez and Camara, 84 YALE L. J. 355 (1974).
156. 540 F.2d at 1070.
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The standard developed by the Seventh Circuit's en banc review
prohibits INS agents from detaining an alien "by force, threat of force,
or a command based on the agent's official authority" unless they have
reason to believe, based on specific articulable facts, that the alien is
illegally in the country. Agents, however, are not prohibited from
questioning any person they reasonably believe to be an alien.1" This
modification elevates the spirit of the footnote in the original affirmance
into the text of the final decree. It is the explicit two-tiered standard
of the District of Columbia Circuit Court that the district court specifi-
cally and rightfully rejected. The modification interpreted Section
287(a)(1) to authorize INS agents to question individuals upon a reason-
able suspicion of alienage, while requiring suspicion of illegal alienage
for interrogation. Furthermore, the en banc standard rejected the dis-
trict court's observation that "initial questioning is a show of authority
to which the average person encountered will feel obliged to stop and
respond."'158
The district court decision in Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod
placed new limits on the authority of INS agent:; to question persons
they perceive to be aliens about their right to be in the United States.
Under the standard formulated by the district court, INS agents lacked
authority to question individuals unless they had a reasonable belief
that their target was an alien unlawfully in the country; and that belief
had to be grounded in specific articulable facts of which race and lan-
guage and dress can be part, but that alone are insufficient. In requiring
a founded suspicion of unlawful alienage for all INS stops of indi-
viduals, the district court made it clear that the fourth amendment
applied to all immigration interrogations within the country, whether
conducted near the border or in the interior of the country.
The extensive evidence in the record demonstrating that one faces
detention if he refuses to answer INS questions supports the district
court's refusal to distinguish between an INS agent's authority to
"question" and "interrogate" suspected illegal immigrants. The dis-
trict court's single-tiered standard appears to be the more workable in
practice because the attempt to differentiate between questioning and
interrogation would involve a difficult after-the-fact determination of
which standard was appropriate to the facts of the particular encounter
and would also be subject to abuses.
The Seventh Circuit's original affirmance reflected judicial sup-
port for the district court's pathbreaking limits on INS interrogation
powers. The majority, however, did not demonstrate the district
court's grasp either of the need for these limits or the legal foundation
upon which the district court standard rested. For this reason, the original
157. 548 F.2d 715.
158. 398 F. Supp. at 899.
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majority would have permitted INS agents to engage persons without
even a reasonable suspicion, in "casual conversation," a digression from
the district court standard that is constitutionally and statutorily inade-
quate as well as unworkable in practice.
The rationale for the Seventh Circuit's en banc modification of the
more stringent district court standard is unknown because an opinion
did not accompany the court's order. It does seem clear, however,
that this modification improves upon the original affirmance in that it
does away with the confusing concept of "casual conversation." More-
over, it will curb the harassment of innocent people by INS if properly
enforced by the courts: an INS agent must reasonably suspect, based
on specific articulable facts, that a person is unlawfully in the country
before he can make a "command" based on his authority-for example,
demand a green identity card-or threaten detention. Under the other
tests, an INS agent may question someone on a reasonable suspicion
of alienage alone.
Since most area control operations consist of agents threatening
detention or demanding green cards, the en banc standard should con-
trol any INS street activity, including "visits" to places of employ-
ment.
V. CONCLUSION
The recent Supreme Court cases which place limits on the power
of immigration officials to search for illegal aliens are an important indi-
cation that many traditional INS enforcement practices will not be tol-
erated under the fourth amendment. There is a natural tension between
the need to stem the flow of illegal immigration and the right of the
individual to be free from unreasonable INS intrusions. The need to
enforce this nation's immigration laws is undisputed. The courts, how-
ever, have put to rest the notion that enforcement problems alone
justify intrusions on the fourth amendment. The restraints imposed on
INS by the Illinois Migrant Council standard should not frustrate rea-
sonable and lawful efforts by INS to seek out illegal aliens. The stan-
dard effectively promotes legitimate law enforcement needs, while
recognizing that the fourth amendment will not tolerate abuses by
immigration officials of the magnitude documented by the Seventh Cir-
cuit. To have done otherwise would have been completely to emas-
culate the fourth amendment and would have continued to subject
countless individuals to undue deprivations of their rights to privacy and
free passage. Yet despite law enforcement efforts, the illegal alien
problem continues unabated. The rate of illegal immigration from
Mexico is increasing. 59 Illegal aliens come to the United States for one
159. Mexicans accounted for 90% of the illegal aliens arrested in 1974. 1974 INS A%,.
REP. 9; 89% of the illegal aliens arrested in 1975, 1975 INS ANN. REP. 13; and 99c of illegal
aliens arrested in 1976, 1976 INS ANN. REP. 14.
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reason-to search for work. Unemployment is high; half of Mexico's
eight million workers are unemployed and wages are low.
160
Since employment is the primary reason for illegal entry, alter-
native policies in addition to increasing law enforcement efforts need to
be developed to reduce the incentives to come to the United States.
One method suggested would be to impose criminal penalties on em-
ployers of illegal aliens. In DeCanas v. Bica,16t the Supreme Court held
that, in the absence of federal legislation, the state3 can constitutionally
prohibit employers from hiring illegal aliens and impose criminal sanc-
tions. The anticipated enactment of employer sanction statutes by the
states1 62 requires the passage of a uniform federal enforcement scheme
to regulate illegal alien employment.1 63 Federal legislation will not
only have the inherent benefits of a uniform federal enforcement
scheme, but it will also avoid the problem caused by the migration of
job seeking aliens attracted to those states that lack employer sanction
statutes.
Beyond legitimate law enforcement techniques and federal em-
ployer sanctions, the United States needs to develop a national foreign
160. See Catz, supra note 1, at 753-57. The outlook for the future appears bleak, as it
is uncertain that the Mexican economy will be able to keep pace with the 3.,5% rate of popula-
tion growth. It appears that unemployment levels in Mexico will increase further since 45% of
the population is under 15 years of age. It has been estimated that this will cause the unem-
ployment figures in Mexico to rise to 15,000,000 in 10 years, As in the past, unrelieved immi-
gration pressure will result in increased numbers of illegal entries. Id. at 775,
161. 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (rejecting a preemption challenge to CAL. LAD, COD[; § 2805
(West Supp. 1978)). For a discussion of the constitutional issues in DeCanas see Catz &
Lenard, The Demise of the Implied Federal Preemption Doctrine, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
295 (1977).
162. In the aftermath of the DeCanas decision several sta'.cs have enacted employer
sanction statutes similar to CAL. LAD. CODE § 2805 (West Supp. 1978). See CONN, GIN, STAT.
ANN. § 31-51K (West Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705 (Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN,
§ 21-4409 (Supp. 1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 871 (West Supp, 1978). MASS, GMN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 19c (West Supp. 1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-A:4-A:5 (1976); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 444a (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 40.1-11.1 (Michi' Supp. 1977).
163. The House of Representatives has twice approved legislation creating employer
sanctions, the bills, died when the Senate failed to act on them, preferring its own. The Holuse
and Senate proposals, however, differ in scope. Briefly, H.R. 8713, the Rodino bill eliminate,
the proviso in 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a) (4) (1970) that employment will not constitute harboring, and
in effect makes unlawful the knowing employment of an "alien in the United States who has
not been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent re;idence, unless the employ-
ment of such alien is authorized by the Attorney General." H.R. 8713, 94th Cong., 1st Sest,
§ 2 (1975). Enforcement is a three-tiered process. The first step is the issuance of a citation,
second, the imposition of a civil penalty up to $500 for each alien knowingly hired; and fi-
nally, the imposition of criminal sanctions. The bill permits the Attorney General to initiate
a civil action if an employer discriminates against an individual on the basis of national ori-
gin. Finally, it provides for amnesty, allowing status adjustment for an alien continuously
physically present in the United States since June 30, 1968 and wltose deportation after June
30, 1975 would result in undue personal hardship. Id. at §§ 3, 4(a). The Eastland bill, S. 3074,
provides for the importation of an alien worker whenever domestic workers are unavailable
for the same work. S. 3074, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1976). Moreover, the bill imposes only
civil sanctions against the knowing employment of undocumented aliens and bars liability
if the employer makes a bona fide inquiry. A signed statement frora the prospective employee
attesting that he is not an alien constitutes prima facie proof that the bona fide inquiry has been
made.
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policy to assist Mexico with its complex social and economic problems.
Rather than committing ourselves to expanded border surveillance and
obtrusive inland operations, the United States should, along with
Mexico, develop bilateral programs of economic development, techni-
cal assistance, expansion of trade, population control, agrarian develop-
ment, and land reform. In the last analysis, the problem of illegal entry
is the result of the "pull" of this country's unskilled labor demands, and
the "pushes" in Mexico,164 caused by high unemployment, low wages,
population growth and other economic factors. 165  Illegal immigration
must be given far greater attention in our conduct of foreign affairs.
The development of a comprehensive national policy166 must be directed
at reducing the "push-pull" factors if the illegal alien flow is to be
reduced. One thing is certain, INS reliance on "dragnet" approaches
to law enforcement is impermissible, ineffective, discriminatory, and
promotes public disrespect for law enforcement.
164. For a discussion of the "push-pull" factors of illegal migration, see PREsIoEN'VS
INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE STUDY, DOMESTIC COUNCIL ON ILLEGAL ALIE'S, PRELIMINARY
REPORT. See also, A. FRAGOMEN, THE ILLEGAL ALIEN: CRIMINAL OR EcoNO.%lC REFiGEE?
(1973); J. KARKASION, THE ILLEGAL AuEN (1976); Dagodag, Source Regions and Composition
of Illegal Mexican Immigration to California, 9 IN'L MIGRATION REV. 499 (1975).
165. A Washington Post editorial noted:
[T]he real problem is how the countries of the world are going to work out the problem
of redistributing the wealth in general and of stabilizing the food supply in particular.
...As long as there are hungry, jobless people in the world, they are bound to head
across frontiers in search of better lives. There is no practical way of sealing the Mexi-
can and Canadian borders against illegal entry. And it is hard to get the message back
to the "teeming shore" that those who were once welcome are now an intolerable
burden.
...The real solutions, to the extent that there are any, lie with the government
of the United States and those nations in a position to help the less developed coun-
tries, with economic development and aid and with measures to improve the distribu-
tion of food and the means of producing food. That is where the problem of -illegal
immigration" begins and is probably the only place it can be solved.
Illegal Importation: A Global Problem, Washington Post, Nov. 13, 1974, § A, at 24, col. 2.
166. See Manulkin & Maghame, A Proposed Solution to the Problem of the Undocu-
mented Mexican Alien Worker, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 42 (1975). See also Nafziger, A Polic,
Framework for Regulating the Flow of Undocumented Mexican Aliens into the United
States, 56 ORE. L. REV. 63 (1977).
